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THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE
LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT: THE
RETREAT FROM ABSOLUTISM
PHILIP L. MARTIN*
INTRODUCTION
In 1946 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its precedent of classify-
ing matters of representation as political questions to be answered
by the elected branches of the government even though malappor-
tionment favoring rural interests was depriving other citizens of
their democratic rights.) Yet, it should have been apparent at the
time of the Colegrove opinion that this issue could not be ignored
forever because the last rurally dominated census was recorded in
1910.2 That a closer scrutiny of representational systems would be
needed in the future became obvious during the next decade as the
character of the nation was changed dramatically by a rapid growth
in urbanization while there was a substantial decline in rural popu-
lation. This increasing disparity coupled with the refusal of state
legislatives to obey their constitutional mandates requiring, for the
purpose of achieving equity, adjustments in their apportionment
after each decennial census persuaded the Supreme Court that it
should again review the matter of how representation is allocated.
An imposing influence on this decision was the problems cre-
ated, particularly in metropolitan areas, by legislative abnegation
of responsibility. While cities shouldered a disproportionate share of
the tax burden, one study has noted that "[w]hen it came to the
distribution of statewide revenues in order to aid schools, highways,
streets, mass transit, air pollution or welfare programs, malappor-
tioned legislatures devised ingenious formulas that shortchanged
their urban constitutents. '' 3 Baker v. Carr' overturned tradition in
1962 by declaring the apportionment of representation to be a justi-
ciable question, though this ruling necessitated the formulation of
* Professor of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
B.S. Virginia Polytechnic Institute; M.A., Ph.D., University of North Carolina.
1. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
2. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (1965).
3. T. MITAU, DECADE OF DECISION 113 (1967).
4. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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guidelines because there were no precedents upon which imple-
menting decisions could be based.
The first step in this direction was taken in 1964 when the "one
man, one vote" principle was enunciated for congressional districts5
and state legislatures.' However, the diverse patterns of electoral
schemes used by state governments could not be easily categorized
for standardizing solutions, and the Supreme Court subsequently
had to make a number of clarifications. As a result reapportionment
requirements have ranged from flexibility to mathematical strin-
gency, but in several recent decisions there has been a return to
demanding less rigorous standards. This article will examine the
latest reapportionment rulings for the purpose of ascertaining why
the Supreme Court has retreated from requiring absolute equality
for the state legislatures.
I. THE TREND OF LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT: 1964-1969
When the "one person, one vote" 7 standard was defined in
Reynolds v. Sims, it was obviously intended to mean something less
than absolute equality. On this score the Court said that
we mean that the Equal Protection Clause requires that a
State make an honest and good effort to construct districts
in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal popula-
tion as is practicable. We realize that it is a practical im-
possibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one
has an identical number of residents, or citizens, or voters.
Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable
constitutional requirement.8
The indication that flexibility in electoral arrangements is constitu-
tionally permissible was further reinforced by the special emphasis
given to the "as nearly as practicable" clause in the Court's realistic
admission that "[i]ndiscriminate districting, without any regard
for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may
be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering." 9
5. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
6. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
7. Presumably, in deference to the equal rights movement of women, the Supreme
Court has changed the Reynolds principle to "one person, one vote." Wells v. Edwards, 409
U.S. 1095, 1095 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
8. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 578-79.
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Concerning their effect on state legislative apportionment, the
Reynolds caveats were interpreted by a leading authority as mean-
ing that there exist several possible exceptions to mathematical
stringency:
In a left-handed sort of way the Court did speak in one
section of the Reynolds opinion of several possibly legiti-
mate nonpopulation considerations: "insuring some voice
to political subdivisions, as subdivisions;" "according polit-
ical subdivisions some independent representation in at
least one body of the state legislature;" following principles
of compactness and continguity in districting; achiev[ing]
"some flexibility by creating multimember or floterial
districts;" "effectuat[ing] . . . a rational state policy.' 0
Support for this analysis was seemingly provided in a companion
case, Lucas v. Forty-fourth Colorado General Assembly." Its deci-
sion led another commentator to conclude that "maximum popula-
tion variances among the [state legislative] districts in the ratio of
1 to 1.7 are at least 'arguably' permissible."'" This latitude could,
of course, conceivably enable state legislatures to preserve the integ-
rity of many traditional subdivisions in making judicially accepta-
ble reapportionment; but despite the connotation of flexibility con-
tained in the Lucas ruling, a closer reading of Reynolds discloses
that only a narrow deviation from a zero population variance is
constitutionally permissible. Addressing this point, the Supreme
Court said:
So long as the divergences from a strict population stan-
dard are based on legitimate considerations incident to the
effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from
the equal-population principle are consitutionally permissi-
ble . . . . But neither history alone, nor economic or other
sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempt-
ing to justify disparities from population-based representa-
tion.'3
10. R. DIXON, DEiMocRATic REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITIcS 271
(1968).
11. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
12. Note, The Case for District Court Management of the Reapportionment Process,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 504, 513-14 (1966) (footnote omitted). See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Colorado
General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 727, 730 (1964).
13. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579-80 (1964) (footnote omitted).
1974l
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While theoretically designed to achieve the goal of perfect appor-
tionment, a consistent application of the "one person, one vote"
guideline has not been easy in later cases because in practice it has
been difficult to balance this objective against the nonpopulation
factors alluded to in Reynolds as considerations for attaining equita-
ble representation.
The first test of what was intended in the Lucas and Reynolds
rulings came the next year in Fortson v. Dorsey4 which upheld the
use of an electoral system that combined a multimember district
with a residence requirement for the election of state legislators.
According to this plan, Fulton County, Georgia was divided into
seven districts for the purpose of determining residence for the seven
state senators who were elected at-large. Since it would be possible
for a district to elect more than one senator or since a district might
reject its resident candidate who could still be elected by the coun-
tywide vote, the multimember provision was challenged as being in
violation of the equality standard. In upholding this plan the Su-
preme Court considered the senators to be as much the representa-
tives of the entire county upon whose vote their election depended
as the district in which they resided. This decision, however, was not
an unqualified approval of flexibility as originally thought inas-
much as "[iut was not widely realized that plaintiff's contentions
were very narrow and did not reach the crucial issue of unfair im-
pact on political representation needs in the multimember counties,
flowing from the winner-take-all aspect of the at-large election sys-
tem.""
The accuracy of this appraisal was demonstrated in the next
significant case of Swann v. Adams"6 in which a tougher position was
taken with the warning that anything larger than "de minimis"
deviations in the population among state legislative districts would
have to be justified by an "acceptable state policy."' 7 Although the
population variance ratios in the Florida senate and house were only
1.3 to 1 and 1.4 to 1, its reapportionment was found unconstitu-
tional, as mathematical exactness was the sole criterion used in the
judicial evaluation, and the Court did not specify what factors
14. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
15. R. DIXON, supra note 10, at 477.
16. 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
17. Id. at 440, 444.
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would constitute an "acceptable state policy" for justifying "de
minimis" variations. It soon became apparent though that there
might not be any permissible exceptions to perfect equality for state
legislative representation.
Two years later the issue confronting the Court in the cases of
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler'8 and Wells v. Rock -[eller'9 concerned how
much divergence would be allowed from the numerical ideal in con-
gressional apportionment. The states involved, Missouri and New
York, acted on the assumption that population differences among
districts are unavoidable if there is to be a
legitimate regard for such factors as the representation of
district interest groups, the integrity of county lines, the
compactness of districts, the population trends within the
State, the high proportion of military personnel, college
students, and other nonvoters in some districts, and the
political realities of "legislative inter-play."2
Therefore, their electoral plans, which had maximum percentage
deviations of 5.97 and 13.1 respectively, were rejected on the
grounds that the " 'as nearly as practicable' standard requires that
the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical
equality.' 1 According to this interpretation, "[e]qual representa-
tion for equal number of people is a principle designed to prevent
debasement of voting power and diminution of access to elective
representatives. ' 2 It was further emphasized that "[tioleration of
even small deviations detracts from these purposes. 21 3 In other
words, the Kirkpatrick and Wells decisions assigned to arithmetic
precision a priority over all other factors unless the judiciary be-
lieves variance is justifiable or unavoidable "despite a good-faith
effort to achieve absolute equality. 21 4
The demand for stringently applying the "one person, one vote"
formula in congressional districting is the most extreme position
taken by the Supreme Court for any reapportionment. Yet, not all
18. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
19. 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
20. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530 (1969).
21. Id. at 529.
22. Id. at 531.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 530.
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of the majority were at ease with a stricter requirement of the
Reynolds mandate. On one hand Justice Fortas concurred with the
Kirkpatrick ruling as he found fault with Missouri's procedure, but
he disapproved of tightly defining the "as nearly as practicable"
concept.25 Moreover, he believed that the Court had virtually elimi-
nated all justifications for digressing from a rigid correlation of pop-
ulation and ballot.2 6 For example, it was pointed out that despite a
genuine concern with special interest representation, the traditional
argument of geographic compactness was refused because "[a]
state's preference for pleasingly shaped districts can hardly justify
population variances."27
In both cases three Justices flatly opposed the new course
charted by their colleagues. First, because of their previous disa-
greement with the Court's abandoning of the political questions
classification of representation, Justices Harlan and Stewart joined
in dissent. Objecting to the straitjacket placed by the majority upon
legislative discretion in reapportionment, Justice Harlan remon-
strated that
the Court now transforms a political slogan into a consti-
tutional absolute. Straight indeed is the path of the right-
eous legislator. Slide rule in hand, he must avoid all
thought of county lines, local traditions, politics, history
and economics, so as to achieve the magic formula: one
man, one vote.28
Apart from its sarcasm, the gist of this rebuttal was that the major-
ity was ignoring its own warning against partisan gerrymandering
in order to achieve "voting equalitarianism" which Justices Harlan
and Stewart have consistently regarded as a mythical rather than a
practical goal in matters of democratic representation.29
A more cogent dissent which has implications for the future was
registered by Justice White who for the first time disagreed with the
Supreme Court's conclusions concerning reapportionment. In his
opinion the "Court's new ruling is an unduly rigid and unwarranted
application of the Equal Protection Clause which will unnecessarily
25. Id. at 536-37.
26. Id. at 537.
27. Id. at 534.
28. Id. at 540-41 (dissenting opinion).
29. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 2
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involve the courts in the abrasive task of drawing district lines." 0
This responsibility would logically result from the intolerant atti-
tude of the majority toward the reasons for establishing variance
and their insistence upon almost absolute instead of substantial
equality for legislative apportionment. Recognizing that census fig-
ures are often imprecise, or at least not accurate for very long due
to population shifts, Justice White also predicted that gerrymander-
ing could be more easily manipulated under the Kirkpatrick rule
because "[i]f county and municipal boundaries are to be ignored,
a computer can produce countless plans for population equality, one
differing very little from another, but each having its own very
different political ramifications."'" Therefore, it was recommended
that the Supreme Court should, under normal circumstances, re-
strict its decision-making to the formulation of broad guidelines
which can be implemented by legislatures or nonpartisan commis-
sions. Otherwise, Justice White feared, the judiciary would ulti-
mately have to resolve such problems as "whether some families in
an apartment house should vote in one district and some in another,
if that would come closer to the standard of apparent equality."3
Although only congressional apportionment was regulated by
the Kirkpatrick and Wells rulings, their tone certainly implied that
state legislatures were similarly affected. However, Justice White's
dissent gained support in subsequent cases, and this impact along
with changes in the Court's membership has encouraged its retreat
from mathematical stringency. Prior to the total departure from a
position of expecting strict egalitarianism in every instance to one
emphasizing a reasonable approximation of equality in the interest
of representing more than just numbers in a governing body there
had been a reconsideration of how the "one person, one vote" princi-
ple should apply to local government. In 1971 the Supreme Court
in Abate v. Mundt32'" declared that the population deviations con-
tained in local apportionment structures should not always be con-
trolled by the standards established for national and state legisla-
tive districting because "local legislative bodies frequently have
fewer representatives than do their state and national counterparts
30. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 544 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
31. Id. at 547 (dissenting opinion).
32. Id.
32.1. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
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and . . .some local legislative districts may have a much smaller
population than do congressional and state legislative districts. '3
Not only was local representation placed in a separate category but
there was also an endorsement of geographical differentiation and
historical legitimacy as factors warranting an exception to the
Reynolds doctrine.34 Moreover, in a companion case, which was re-
manded to the lower courts for an additional review of its facts, the
Court nevertheless indicated that "[in our view .. .experience
and insight have not yet demonstrated that multi-member districts
are inherently invidious and violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 13 5 This reaffirmation of a conceivable flexibility was conse-
quently interpreted by some state legislatures to mean that they
would not have to practice the exactitude specified by Kirkpatrick
and Wells in realigning their election districts after the decennial
census was reported. Thus, a new wave of litigation began in 1972.
II. RETURN TO REYNOLDS
After the Abate pronouncement, the first implementation of its
qualifications brought before the Supreme Court involved represen-
tation in a state legislature. Beginning in 1971 the Revised Virginia
Constitution requires the reapportionment of legislative election
districts every ten years according to the "as nearly as practicable"
population measure .3 When the state carried out its constitutional
mandate, it prepared plans for each chamber with the result that
the Supreme Court's decision is in essence divided into separate
parts dealing with different problems.
A. The House of Delegates
First, in the case of the lower house an ideal district in 1971
should have contained 46,485 persons per delegate, but the scheme
designed by the legislature had a maximum variance of 16.4 percent
because of an effort to preserve the integrity of traditional local
government boundaries by using a combination of floterial, single
and multimember districts. Recognizing the sincerity of Virginia's
33. Id. at 185.
34. For an analysis of the weight assigned by the Court to these points, see Martin, The
Constitutional Status of Local Government Reapportionment, 6 VAL. U.L. REV. 237, 246-52
(1972).
35. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 159-60 (1972).
36. REv. VA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
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intention, a three-judge federal court nonetheless rejected the elec-
toral policy on the grounds that the state had not demonstrated that
representation by political subdivision was necessary to the fulfill-
ment of a governmental policy. Therefore, the consolidated court
undertook the "abrasive task" forecast by Justice White 3 and sub-
stituted its own plan which to a degree adhered to the boundaries
of state subdivisions while reducing the differential from the ideal
district to 10 percent. This deviation was justified as falling "within
[the] passable constitutional limits as 'a good-faith effort to
achieve absolute equality.' ",38 In its counterargument against this
decision Virginia charged the lower court with misapplying the pre-
cedents of Kirkpatrick v. Preisler39 and Wells v. Rockefeller4 whose
purpose, it was contended, was to elucidate the holding in Wesberry
v. Sanders that "the command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives
be chosen 'by the People of the several States' means that as nearly
as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be
worth as much as another's."' The state thus claimed that its legis-
lative reapportionment was subject only to the principles enunci-
ated in Reynolds v. Sims."
Reviewing the Virginia case, the Supreme Court in Mahan v.
Howell'' agreed that the inflexible standards of Kirkpatrick and
Wells were inapplicable to state legislative districting inasmuch as
those rulings were intended to affect only congressional apportion-
ment. Relying on the Reynolds caveats, 3 the Court also interpreted
them to mean that since there are generally more state legislative
than congressional seats distributed throughout a state, there could
probably be, while providing adequate statewide representation, a
greater use of political subdivision as election units for the state
legislature than would be feasible for allocating membership in the
national House of Representatives. In addition it was pointed out
that Reynolds mentioned the possibility of giving political subdivi-
sions per se some independent representation in at least one cham-
37. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
38. Howell v. Mahan, 330 F. Supp. 1138, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1971).
39. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
40. 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
41. 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
42. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
42.1. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
43. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
19741
Martin: The Supreme Court and State Legislative Reapportionment: The Retr
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
40 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ber of the state legislature. This alternative was based on the follow-
ing longtime practice:
Local governmental entities are frequently charged
with various responsibilities incident to the operation of
state government. In many States much of the legislature's
activities involves the enactment of so-called local legisla-
tion, directed only to the concerns of particular political
subdivisions. And a State may legitimately desire to con-
struct districts along political subdivision lines to deter the
possibilities of gerrymandering . . ..
Noting the extensive power vested in Virginia's General Assembly
to enact special legislation concerning the organization and powers
of local governments, 5 the original apportionment was upheld be-
cause "[t]he statute redistricting the House of Delegates consis-
tently sought to avoid the fragmentation of such subdivisions, as-
sertedly to afford them a voice in Richmond to seek such local
legislation.""
To give empirical verification to this conclusion, several exam-
ples were included. First, Scott County with a population of 24,376
was originally placed in a district with three other demographically
similar counties having a combined population of 76,346. Since this
district deviated from numerical perfection by 8.3 percent, five of
Scott County's census enumeration units containing 6,063 persons
were transferred by the lower court to an adjacent district thereby
reducing the maximum percentage variance to 1.8. The Mahan
court regarded this quest for equality as inconsequential in compari-
son to the reduction of Scott County's political participation in its
original district and to the practically nonexistent representation for
the people transferred to the second district whose other population
totaled 87,041. Not even a multimember arrangement in each situa-
tion was considered sufficient to provide much opportunity for citi-
zens to seek local legislation relating to Scott County.
Another reference was made to the City of Virginia Beach
which was initially given three delegates for its population of
44. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580-81 (1964).
45. See REv. VA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 2-3.
46. 410 U.S. at 323.
[Vol. 9
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172,106, and to correct areawide underrepresentation, the city was
also included in a one delegate floterial district along with parts of
the Cities of Chesapeake and Portsmouth. After abolishing the flo-
terial district, the lower court had to reassign 29,136 Virginia Beach
citizens to a multimember district comprising the 307,951 persons
living in the City of Norfolk. As a result of constituting only 8.6
percent of the Norfolk district's population, the reallocated people
convinced the Supreme Court that "such representation is no repre-
sentation at all so far as local legislation is concerned" and that they
have "in that respect been effectively disfranchized."'' The desire
for approximate equality was thus classified as a secondary consid-
eration in Virginia.
To establish currency for the idea that local legislation is a
rational state policy justifying an exception to strict enforcement of
the "one person, one vote" formula, there was a review of previous
decisions in which the issue had been whether a minimal divergence
from voting equity should be allowed in order to preserve the integ-
rity of political subdivision boundaries. This problem coincidentally
had been faced in an earlier case involving Virginia whose legislative
reapportionment at that time had been rejected only for exceeding
a reasonable deviation from equality. 8 In a collateral case the Court
gave the following definition for a permissive population-variance
ratio:
In our view the problem does not lend itself to any such
uniform formula, and it is neither practicable nor desirable
to establish rigid mathematical standards for evaluating
the constitutional validity of a state legislative apportion-
ment scheme under the Equal Protection Clause. Rather,
the proper judicial approach is to ascertain whether, under
the particular circumstances existing in the individual
State whose legislative apportionment is at issue, there has
been a faithful adherence to a plan of population-based
representation, with such minor deviations only as may
occur in recognizing certain factors that are free from any
taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.49
47. Id. at 324.
48. Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1968).
For a discussion of this case, see Eisenberg, Legislative Reapportionment and Congres-
sional Redistricting in Virginia, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 295 (1966).
49. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964).
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Pronouncements such as the above led the Congressional Legisla-
tive Reference Service to conclude that there is no precise method
of measurement for state legislative apportionment and that most
likely a combination of several methods would be necessary to
achieve equitable representation. 0 This philosophy was incorpo-
rated into the Mahan ruling which emphasized that the fourteenth
amendment neither contains nor suggests a mathematical equation
legitimizing a range of percentage deviations.'
On the basis of the preceding evidence the Supreme Court as-
serted that the intention to foster local legislation is a legitimate
objective within the meaning of Reynolds,"2 and it declined to review
the question of whether it is wise to empower a state legislature to
enact such laws. Yet, there was no repudiation of those decisions
which had declared state reapportionments unconstitutional be-
cause of excessive deviations from the Reynolds equation.5 3 To the
contrary, the Mahan majority reaffirmed the necessity of the "as
nearly of equal population as is practicable" stipulation which by
extrapolation means a review of each situation will be necessary to
ascertain if a "good faith effort" has been made to provide equitable
representation. 4 In the case of the Virginia House of Delegates this
purpose was adjudged to have been implemented without violating
voting rights.
B. The Virginia Senate
In the second part of its ruling the Supreme Court upheld the
lower court's order changing the state's plan of dividing the entire
jurisdiction encompassing the Cities of Norfolk and Virginia Beach
into three senatorial precincts of almost equal population. The fault
discerned in this alignment was that the approximately 37,000 mili-
tary personnel stationed in the area including those living aboard
ships "homeported" to the Norfolk Naval Station were counted in
the official census tracts upon which the redistricting was based.
Therefore, the special court declared the three-single member dis-
tricts to be malapportioned, but lacking the kind of survey data
50. J. KILLIAN, METHODS FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT SYSTEMS
(1965).
51. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973).
52. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
53. Specific reference was made to the cases of Swann v. Adams, 395 U.S. 440 (1967)
and Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
54. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 824-25 (1973).
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needed to rearrange the election boundaries according to the actual
population, the Court converted the individual units into a multi-
member district for the purpose of having the state senators elected
at-large.
Answering the charge that the solution of the federal court ex-
ceeded its authority, the Supreme Court emphasized that judicial
remedies in matters of representation must follow the guidelines set
forth in Reynolds v. Sims.55 Its recommendation was that:
In awarding or withholding immediate relief, a court is enti-
tled to and should consider the proximity of a forthcoming
election and the mechanics and complexities of state elec-
tion laws .... 11
These were apposite instructions for the Virginia situation inas-
much as its 1971 elections were to be held within a few months after
the court order. 7 In addition the substitute scheme was affirmed as
the only feasible alternative for correcting an obvious malapportion-
ment while avoiding the Supreme Court's mandate against discrim-
ination of the voting rights of military personnel. 8
C. The Dissent
There was complete agreement on the second part of the Mahan
decision because of the special circumstances, but the vote on the
apportionment of the Virginia House of Delegates was 5 to 359 with
Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall registering a strong dissent
against the 16.4 percent deviation. Not only did they believe the
maximum percentage variance to be at least this great but, depend-
ing upon the method of calculation used, it was asserted that the
difference might be as high as 23.6 percent.8 0 Regardless of what was
the actual deviation, the minority still considered Virginia's policy
to be as unrepresentative as those previously rejected by the Su-
preme Court.
55. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
56. Id. at 585.
57. As a result of litigation the state's primary elections had been postponed from June
8 until September 14, 1971.
58. Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 691-92 (1964).
59. Justice Powell did not participate in the case because his former law firm was
involved.
60. This figure was derived by computing deviations in the floterial districts.
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The Mahan dissenters also dismissed as specious the majority's
argument that local legislation could best be secured by maintain-
ing the integrity of political subdivision boundaries in constructing
election districts. In their opinion
. . .the best that can be said of appellant's efforts to secure
county representation is that the plan can be effective only
with respect to some unspecified but in all likelihood small
number of issues which affect a single county and which are
overwhelmingly important to the voters of that county; and
even then it provides effective representation only where
the affected county represents a large enough percentage of
the voters in the district to have a significant impact on the
election of the delegate. '
In short, three Justices believe that absolute equality is the primary
principle guiding apportionment and that there is no rational basis
for upholding unequal representation which by its nature unconsti-
tutionally dilutes the voting power of citizens. Interpreting Swann
v. Adams,62 it was alleged that only in cases of necessity, not ration-
ality, would any departure from the "one person, one vote" measure
be constitutionally permissible.6 '" The tenor of the Mahan dissent,
however, generates doubt as to whether any necessity would be
judicially acceptable.
D. Conclusion
One disagreement in the Mahan case illustrates a difficulty the
Supreme Court has created for the resolution of reapportionment
problems. This point concerns the dissenter's disclaimer that the
applicability of the Reynolds standard is categorically different for
federal, state and local governments. They criticized such a classifi-
cation as being a disregard of the contemporary constitutional right
of voting equity. Yet, the dichotomy can be somewhat verified his-
torically as contended by the Mahan majority. In 1967 Justice
Douglas wrote a unanimous opinion in which he concluded that
"[v]iable local governments may need many innovations, numer-
ous combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in munici-
61. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 349 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
62. 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
62.1. Id. at 447.
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss1/2
REAPPORTIONMENT
pal arrangements to meet changing urban conditions." 3 A few years
later state and local apportionment was definitely distinguished
from congressional apportionment 4 with local government seem-
ingly regarded as a special category in contradistinction to state
government. 5 This last delimitation, of course, has been clearly
stated in a later case,"8 but it had remained uncertain whether there
was a similar differentiation of the requirements for congressional
and state representation. On one hand the Supreme Court did enun-
ciate the equal population objective for congressional districting
with very little, if in fact any, allowance for exceptions in the cases
of Wesberry v. Sanders,"7 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler"8 and Wells v.
Rockefeller, 9 whereas the Reynolds decision for state legislatures
mentioned several possible exemptions from mathematical strin-
gency ' while at the same time it denoted only a small amount of
permissible deviation from the norm of "one person, one vote."" As
a consequence then of not having precisely defined precedents sepa-
rating congressional and state reapportionment standards the
Mahan ruling must be construed as establishing discrete categories.
This fact is verified by subsequent decisions in the 1972-73 term of
the Supreme Court.
Ill. THE AFTERMATH OF MAHAN v. HOWELL
One of the implications of Mahan was that political reality
justifies a departure from perfect equality, but no criteria were spec-
ified for gauging the acceptability of such a factor. A second vague
possibility suggested by the Virginia case was that there might be
some range within which variations from the "one person, one vote"
benchmark would be permitted. Both of these variables would ob-
viously require clarification before they could be competently evalu-
ated in other situations. Otherwise, the lower courts and the state
legislatures would have to muddle their way through a variety of
63. Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 112, 116-17 (1967).
64. Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970).
65. These developments are analyzed in Martin, The Supreme Court and Local Reap-
portionment: The Third Phase, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 102, 113-15 (1970).
66. See notes 33 and 34 supra and accompanying text.
67. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
68. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
69. 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
70. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
71. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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probabilities. Since the preceding questions were involved in two
cases on its docket, the Supreme Court provided answers at the end
of its term. Mahan was thus the prelude to a more sweeping modifi-
cation of the precedents for apportioning state representation.
A. Bipartisan Apportionment
The issue over political reality concerned Connecticut where
the state constitution establishes a unique alternative method for
achieving reapportionment in the event the legislature cannot agree
on a plan by April 1 of the year following the taking of the decennial
census.2 When a decision has not been made by this date, the
matter is referred to an eight man bipartisan commission consisting
of two sets of four members appointed respectively by the Demo-
cratic and Republican Party leaders in the legislature.73 If this com-
mission is unable to complete its work by a legislatively determined
deadline, the constitutional process next transfers the task to a
three-member bipartisan board with one appointment being given
to each of the party leaders in the lower chamber." These appoint-
ees then select the third person."
In 1971 initiation of the third stage was necessary to reappor-
tion the Connecticut legislature. The result was a scheme in which
a state senate district deviated from the ideal of 84,228 people by a
maximum of 1.81 percent and an assembly district had a total vari-
ance of 7.83 percent from the ideal population of 20,081. In drawing
up its plan the board had difficulty in reconciling two of Connecti-
cut's constitutional provisions controlling the arrangement of local
representation." On one hand it is stipulated that "no town shall
be divided" in the creation of a lower house election district unless
it is formed "wholly within the town."" On the other hand there is
a conflicting mandate that the "establishment of districts. . . shall
be consistent with federal constitutional standards."" Conse-
72. CONN. CONST. art. 1II, § 6.
73. Id. at § 6(b).
74. Id. at § 6(c).
75. Id. at § 6(d).
76. In Connecticut, as in all New England states, counties are divided into constituent
towns. A county serves principally as a judicial district while a town is the basic political unit
assigned governmental and legislative responsibilities. See C. ADRAN, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 206-07 (1972).
77. CONN. CONST. art. III, § 4.
78. Id. at § 5.
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quently, the board had to cut 47 of the state's 169 towns in order to
make what was regarded as an equitable redistricting. All align-
ments though were based on a concept of "political fairness" which
was designed to achieve arithmetic equity along with a rough ap-
proximation of the proportional strength registered by the two major
political parties in the preceding three statewide elections. Instead
of reflecting the differences in party membership within the old
districts in the new ones this improvisation attained a desired equal-
ity for the entire state by calculating the average number of Demo-
cratic and Republican legislative seats during the base period for
the purpose of constructing electoral units which would produce
essentially under similar conditions and circumstances the same
ratio of success between the two major political parties in forthcom-
ing elections.
Unimpressed by this measure a federal district court rejected
the board's reapportionment on the grounds that "partisan political
structuring" is not "a legitimate reason for violating the require-
ment of numerical equality of population in districting."9 Relying
on its reasoning in Mahan 8 coupled with the same references to the
flexibility endorsed by Reynolds, ' the Supreme Court in Gaffney v.
Cummingss'" disagreed with the lower court's conclusion that the
deviation of Connecticut's plan from the "one person, one vote"
principle was excessive. Rather it was contended that the nature of
representation encompasses whatever political preferences are ex-
pressed in the voting booth, in the legislative process and in public
office. Writing for the majority, Justice White noted that these con-
siderations which affect the everyday operation of government could
be obfuscated by an addiction to the politically insensitive method
of counting noses in election districts." Furthermore, the Gaffney
majority stressed that "[t]he very essence of districting is to pro-
duce a different-a more 'politically fair'-result than would be
reached with elections at-large, in which the winning party would
take 100% of the legislative seats. 83 In its opinion political consider-
ations cannot be isolated from districting and reapportionment be-
79. Cummings v. Meskill, 341 F. Supp. 139 (1972).
80. See notes 43-54 supra and accompanying text.
81. See notes 8 and 9 supra and accompanying text.
81.1. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
82. Id. at 749.
83. Id. at 753.
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cause "[d]istrict lines are rarely neutral phenomena." ' , A strict
reliance on census data, it was asserted, could unquestionably
achieve population equality but only at the expense of political
impact and at the risk of producing "whether intended or not, the
most grossly gerrymandered results .. ."85 In any event the Su-
preme Court realistically doubted that those responsible for allocat-
ing representation always worked impartially vith census data, and
it, therefore, reaffirmed the judicial power of reviewing apportion-
ment schemes for the purpose of rectifying constitutional viola-
tions."
At the same time the Gaffney ruling sanctioned politics as a
significant criterion to be weighed in the redrawing of electoral
boundaries it declared the legislature to be more competent for
making such decisions than the judiciary because the political pro-
cess involves bargaining between partisan parties, devising compro-
mises among pressure groups, protecting minority interests, recon-
ciling diverse viewpoints and looking after the general welfare of the
public whereas courts are primarily responsible for correcting
wrongs, preventing abuses of private rights and settling disputes
through judgments and orders. No matter how they might try, the
Supreme Court frankly questioned the ability of courts, including
itself, to understand much less take into account the nuances of
politics in most situations requiring reapportionment. Therefore, it
was ruled for Connecticut and for other cases in general that the
"judicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports
fairly to allocate political power to the parties in accordance with
their voting strength and, within quite tolerable limits, succeeds in
doing so.""s
A salient point in the Gaffney decision was its unequivocal
differentiation of national from state legislative districting. The
Court clearly stated that this issue had been settled in the Mahan
case"8 and that in the future apportionment should be evaluated in
pursuance of the equal protection test enunciated in Reynolds v.
Sims. 9 Yet, much was left to speculation because aside from reiter-
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
87. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973).
88. See notes 63-71 supra and accompanying text.
89. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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ating the Mahan exception of "maintaining the integrity of political
subdivision lines,'"I there was no other indication of what else might
constitute a rational state policy justifying variance from the equal-
population standard. Likewise, there was not any consideration in
Gaffney of whether deviations would only be constitutionally per-
missible within some predetermined limit, but an answer to this last
question was rendered in a concomitant decision.
B. One Person, Nine Tenths of a Vote
Coincidentally, the companion to Gaffney involves very similar
procedures in that the Texas Constitution instructs the state legisla-
ture to reapportion itself at its first session following the decennial
census.9' This requirement was completed in 1970 for the state
House of Representatives, but the legislature could not reach agree-
ment on a redistricting plan for the Senate. Therefore, in accord-
ance with constitutional provisions a Legislative Redistricting
Board" was assembled to realign the Senate, and after the House
scheme was rejected by the Texas Supreme Court, 3 the Board was
ordered to remap the lower chamber. 4
As soon as both reapportionments were officially reported they
were challenged in a three-judge federal court in the case of Graves
v. Barnes..' Although the Board's rearrangement of the Texas Sen-
ate was upheld, the new proposal for the House was declared uncon-
stitutional for two reasons: first, it contained excessive population
disparity;95 and second, the multimember districts established for
Bexar and Dallas Counties diluted the voting power of ethnic and
racial minorities. 6 When it reviewed this decision, the Supreme
90. See notes 44-52 supra and accompanying text.
91. TEx. CONST. art. Il, § 28.
92. The Board consists of five members designated by the Texas Constitution. They
are: the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the state House of Representatives, the Attorney
General, the Comptroller of Public Accounts, and the Commissioner of the General Land
Office. The Board must be convened within ninety days after the final adjournment of the
regular legislative session, and it has sixty days to complete its work. Id.
93. Smith v. Craddick, 471 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1971).
94. Mauzy v. Legislative Redistricting Board, 471 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1971).
94.1. 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
95. The Board's recommendation provided for the 150 representatives to be elected
from 79 single and 11 multimember districts. The total variation from the mathematically
ideal population of 74,645 was 9.9 percent.
96. 343 F. Supp. at 727, 730.
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Court agreed that the upper chamber was properly apportioned and
that the multimember districts violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment,97 but it could not sustain the rejection
of a representational plan on simple mathematical grounds. Con-
cerning what constitutes impermissible deviation from the Reynolds
formula, the district court had interpreted the Kirkpatrick modifi-
cation98 to mean that the "critical issue" in analyzing such problems
is whether "the State [has] justified any and all variances, however
small, on a basis of a consistent rational State policy."" In the
court's opinion, Texas, in deviating from the ideal, was not imple-
menting any state policy other than apportioning the lower house
of its legislature. This was considered to be strictly a state constitu-
tional duty which does not justify inequities in drawing election
boundaries. In addition the special court criticized the actions and
decisions of the Legislative Reapportionment Board, implying that
it had created divergences for political motives, and the Graves
decision doubted "that [the] board did the sort of deliberative job
• . .worthy of judicial abstinence.' ' 0
Referring to the distinction elucidated in both Mahan'0' and
Gaffney,'02 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Kirkpatrick principle
as an inappropriate standard for state legislatures.'0 There was also
a reassertion that congressional and state reapportionment had
never previously have placed in the same category. Excusing the
lower court for not having the latest clarification before it while
hearing the Texas controversy, the White majority explained the
significance of the aforementioned classification by declaring that
for the same reasons outlined in Gaffney v. Cummings'" "we do not
97. It was cautioned that this ruling does not impair the viability of multimember
districts because their use in the Texas case was found to be for the purpose of invidiously
discriminating against the voting strength of certain groups of citizens instead of achieving
equitable representation. When such disqualifications are not present, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that under its precedents "multimember districts are not per se unconstitutional,
nor are they necessarily unconstitutional when used in combination with single-member
districts in other parts of the State." White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973).
98. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
99. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 713 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
100. Id. at 717.
101. See notes 63-71 supra and accompanying text.
102. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
103. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
104. See notes 82-86 supra and accompanying text.
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consider relatively minor population deviations among state legisla-
tive districts to substantially dilute the weight of individual votes
in the larger districts so as to deprive individuals in these districts
of fair and effective representation.' '" 5 Since the Texas plan was
ostensibly designed to achieve the same objective of "political fair-
ness" approved for Connecticut, it was concluded that the maxi-
mum percentage variance of 9.9 was not a violation of the "one
person, one vote" doctrine. However, the warning was issued that
larger differences between districts would require under the
Reynolds mandate a stronger justification in the form of being es-
sential and necessary to the effectuation of a rational state policy.
The implication then was that unless an invidious discrimination
was being perpetrated the Supreme Court will not question the
basis for a population deviation up to 10 percent.
C. The Shortsightedness of Politics
It was this last point that three members of the Court particu-
larly took to task. In their opinion an arbitrary line has been drawn
at 10 percent with the result that any deviations below this mark
do not require any justification, whereas the judiciary will have to
be convinced of the need for excessive variation. The dissenters
deplored this development inasmuch as they believed "it is impor-
tant to understand that the demand for precise mathematical
equality rests neither on a scholastic obsession with abstract num-
bers nor a rigid insensitivity to the political realities of the reappor-
tionment process."' Regardless of what state might be involved, it
was charged that the "paramount concern" in redistricting is "the
right to an equal vote."'0 7 Speaking for the minority, Justice Bren-
nan complained that the Connecticut and Texas decisions had jeop-
ardized the positive gains made for this constitutional guarantee
since jurisdiction over questions of representation was accepted in
Baker v. Carr. 0 s
IV. CONCLUSION
On the same day the preceding rulings for state apportionment
105. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973).
106. Id. at 780-81 (dissenting opinion).
107. Id.
108. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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were reported in Gaffney v. Cummings'9 and White v. Regester' 0
it was also announced in White v. Weiser"' that congressional dis-
tricting is still controlled by a strict demand for arithmetic exact-
ness thereby clearly delimiting the extent of the Supreme Court's
retreat from absolute equality. Although this case was somewhat
complicated by a reversal of the lower court's management of judi-
cial process, it firmly stated that while the percentage deviations
contained in Texas' congressional plan were smaller than those in-
validated in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler and Wells v. Rockefeller,"2 they
were not found to be unavoidable and consequently the districts
were not as equal in population as the Court thought was possible
under the prevailing circumstances of reapportionment in Texas.
Distinguishing state from congressional requirements, the
Mahan justification for a differential caused by an effort to avoid
fragmentation of local governments"3 was adjudged inappliable for
congressional districting. This difference was based on the conclu-
sion that "at some point or level in size, population variances do
import invidious devaluation of the individual's vote and represent
a failure to accord him fair and effective representation.""' 4 Since
congressional districts have greater populations than those estab-
lished for state legislators, it was pointed out how each percentage
point of deviation could in most instances include as many as 5,000
people who are underrepresented in their national House of Repre-
sentatives. In addition special consideration for preserving the in-
tegrity of political subdivision boundaries was regarded as being less
important for Congress whose "districts are not so intertwined and
freighted with local interests as are state legislative dis-
tricts. ... "I Thus, the case of White v. Weiser removes all doubt
regarding the constitutional status of state legislative apportion-
ment.
By giving a more comprehensive and precise definition to a
great deal of what is intended, the Supreme Court in 1973 has also
109. 412 U.s. 735 (1973).
110. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
111. 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
112. See notes 18-27 supra and accompanying text.
113. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
114. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 792-93 (1973).
115. Id. at 793.
116. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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eliminated the uncertainty created by Swann v. Adams"' and the
subsequent congressional redistricting decisions of 1969."1 More-
over, the recognition of political variables has injected realism into
the quest for more equal legislative representation, but this ap-
proach will require the resolution of another fundamental issue.
Sooner or later, the Court will have to come to grips with the propo-
sition of partisan gerrymandering which is too much an integral part
of the total reapportionment problem to be forever ignored. Re-
served in an earlier ruling,"" this question was more definitely pre-
sented in the Wells case, but at that time the Justices preferred to
sidestep the challenge by letting its decision rest upon a clarification
of the "as nearly as practicable" standard."' Nevertheless, the crux
of the matter is that "political fairness" is not necessarily the same
thing as constitutionally correct representation since it is possible
to draw district lines with the result that legislative dominance is
given to one faction at the expense of others. Justice White, in his
Wells dissent, equated districting itself with "gerrymandering in the
sense that it represents a complex blend of political, economic, re-
gional, and historical considerations. '""2" Therefore, he concluded
that:
In terms of the gerrymander, the situation will not be much
different if equality means what it literally says-a zero
variation-rather than only "substantial" equality which
would countenance some variations among legislative dis-
tricts. Either standard will prevent a minority of the popu-
lation or a minority party from consistently controlling the
state legislature or a congressional delegation and both are
powerful forces toward equalizing voter influence on legisla-
tive performance. In terms of effective representation for all
voters there are only miniscule differences between the two
standards. But neither rule can alone prevent deliberate
partisan gerrymandering if that is considered an evil which
the Fourteenth Amendment should attempt to proscribe.'
Now that "substantial" equality has been endorsed as the criterion
117. See notes 18-24 supra and accompanying text.
118. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
119. Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 544 (1969).
120. Id. at 554-55 (dissenting opinion).
121. Id. at 555 (dissenting opinion).
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for districting state legislatures Justice White's commentary is even
more pertinent.
The evidence indicates that the Supreme Court at various
times has been contemplating the practicality of ruling on the invid-
ious practice of partisan gerrymandering. In Whitcomb v. Chavis
the dissenters questioned if the time had not come to determine
"whether a gerrymander can be 'constitutionally impermissi-
ble.' "122 Manifesting an awareness of this political discrimination,
the majority in Gaffney v. Cummings acknowledged the probability
of census data being manipulated occasionally for political purposes
as implicit grounds for maintaining the power to examine how elec-
tion lines are drawn. 23 On the basis of these statements it is reasona-
ble to anticipate that a future phase of judicial review over reappor-
tionment will concern the legitimacy of partisan gerrymandering.
This could be a bold step for the Court to take, but until this defect
is remedied, the ultimate goal of effective representation, that is,
"the equalization of citizen influence on legislative outcomes
S. . ,,4 cannot be realized.
122. 403 U.S. 124, 176 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
124. Dixon, Local Representation: Constitutional Mandates and Apportionment
Options, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 694, 711 (1968).
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